Swords of Iron: Is the Status still Quo?

Zugzwang in Gaza

Until late 2023, there had been two days over the last few years when my brain simply short-circuited: the fall of Kabul to the Taliban (again) on August 15, 2021, and Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022. Both of these were predictable and predicted events, but the anticipation did not reduce the despair when they occurred.

Then October 7 joined that wonderful pantheon of disastrous dates, and unlike the others, it was not some ineluctable cataclysm. That day was among the worst, most shocking days of my life, not least because one of my siblings came close to being killed in the initial attack. Rumours swirled throughout the synagogue that day that something terrible had happened, but they were too ridiculous to be believed. That evening we discovered the rumours did not come close to capturing what had actually transpired.

My initial catatonia eventually gave way to a grim conviction, one almost universally shared by Israelis and Jews, that a total war to destroy Hamas was necessary. This had changed everything. There could be no return to the October 6 status quo.  

Now, 11 months into “Operation Swords of Iron”, it’s time for some cynical, fatalistic, stream-of-consciousness doom porn one can more dispassionately evaluate the results of the war to date (Caveat lector: I am a pathological doomer, outrageously exaggerating, if not outright fabricating, worst-case scenarios and placing very selective emphasis on negative information while ignoring or playing down positive information. Hopefully that is what’s happening here).

Hamas has taken tens of thousands of casualties and its entire senior military leadership and almost all local commanders and deputy commanders in Gaza are dead. A substantial proportion of Hamas’ tunnel infrastructure, built over nearly two decades and including vital cross-border tunnels to Egypt for smuggling weapons, funds and other necessary material, has been destroyed or disabled, while Hamas’ rocket arsenal has been almost entirely depleted and many of the facilities to indigenously produce them destroyed. All of this was done at unexpectedly low cost in IDF casualties and vehicle losses, with Hamas putting up generally ineffective resistance. This is an unambiguously crushing tactical victory. Certainly, Hamas will never be able to do something on the scale of October 7 again.

But October 7 was never going to happen again. It was a one-time operation that took years to plan and prepare, and while Hamas went to great lengths to protect operational security, they needn’t have bothered, because Israel played itself. The insane, imbecilic, impossibly stupid bizarre belief across the entire Israeli political and security establishment that Hamas had ceased to prioritise jihad and cared about governance reportedly led Israeli intelligence to stop spying on Hamas.

Despite this, Israel in fact possessed precise intelligence and concrete warnings about the attack, but the aforementioned delusion about Hamas no longer being a jihadist organisation meant not only was all this information ignored, but the IDF never even trained for such a contingency, which is why the entire Israeli security apparatus systematically imploded for more than 24 hours during the attack. October 7 obviously changed this attitude, and even if Israel had done nothing at all following the attack, it could never have happened again.

The current snapshot of Swords of Iron looks very positive. But Hamas, like other jihadist groups around the world, has survived decades of deportation, detention, leadership decapitation, and near-destruction only to grow even more powerful every 5-10 years. I am dubious about the concept of “enduring victories” and whether any other outcome is possible aside from indefinite conflict management and “mowing the grass”, but the nucleus of Hamas has hitherto survived the onslaught and will likely reconstitute under the current Israeli approach. If Hamas truly believed it was under existential threat, it would take any ceasefire deal Israel had already accepted to preserve its strength. It has not done so.

I don’t know whether this matters from a security perspective given Hamas simply couldn’t repeat October 7 even without the war, or what the alternatives might realistically be to the current approach given domestic and international political realities and resource and manpower constraints, but something resembling the October 6 status quo ante looms frighteningly large on the horizon.

October 7

As long as these terrorist groups exist, their operatives will be arrested by Israel. As long as they’re arrested, there will be attempts to take hostages to free them. That’s the entire modus operandi of the Palestinian national movement and the Islamic Revolution and will continue to be.¹

It’s too early to assess whether October 7 was a miscalculation, a masterstroke, or a bit of both.

On the one hand, Hamas’ faith in the Islamic Revolution’s capacity to wage a real multi-front war that threatened Israel was misplaced, as was its faith in the general Palestinian, Israeli-Arab and wider Muslim attachment to the Palestinian cause, at least in terms of direct action. There was no Israeli-Arab rioting, no widespread intifada in the West Bank, and little in the way of action by the broader Arab and Muslim world.

Hamas also miscalculated how quickly domestic Israeli political pressure, international isolation, UN legal shenanigans, and, most importantly, US pressure, coupled with the pressure from the Islamic Revolution’s attacks that have displaced tens of thousands of Israelis in the north and virtually shut down international shipping through the Suez Canal and Red Sea, would take effect.

The reason Hamas was steamrolled with such ease and at such low cost in Israeli casualties is partially because they were not prepared for a full-blown Israeli invasion, believing the lives of the hostages and threat of a multifront war would deter Israel or, failing that, freeze the conflict long before the group was under existential threat. The plan was and remains to hide in the tunnels with the hostages and hope that all the aforementioned pressure points, intensified by Hamas’ human sacrifice strategy, will force Israel into halting military operations and emptying its prisons.

But the miscalculation was mostly one of timing; Hamas’ assumptions themselves were basically correct. The US pressure on Israel forced it into a ceasefire deal that gave Hamas breathing space and hundreds of prisoners in November, then forced a full withdrawal from Gaza in April, then severely delayed and limited Israel’s attack on Rafah, and is now trying to force a full Israeli capitulation, including releasing hundreds or even thousands more prisoners and withdrawing entirely from Gaza.

The debates and leaks about that US pressure has exacerbated the already intense domestic pressure on Netanyahu to surrender in Gaza over both the hostage issue as well as the mass displacement in the north. It’s not just public pressure and massive protests, either: the entire defense establishment, including Israeli Defence Minister Yoav Gallant and many other senior security officials on and off the record, as well as the other members of the now defunct War Cabinet, want to surrender no matter what and release whoever Hamas asks from prison if it means getting even some hostages back.

The longer Hamas holds out on a ceasefire deal, the more this pressure will build, and the weaker and more divided Israel will become. October 7 temporarily unified a politically and socially imploding country, but that’s over now. Back to your regularly scheduled programming.

The brutality of October 7 was also meant to drive Israel into a panicked rage that would forever tarnish its reputation and internationally isolate it. Whatever one’s opinion of IDF conduct in and around Gaza, there is no doubt this has been accomplished, at the ICJ, ICC, in Western capitals and on the street. Destroying Israel and supporting Hamas are now considered wedge issues across the world, and Western states have started sanctioning Israelis and imposing partial arms embargoes. This phenomenon will only get worse with time.

The attack also led several Western countries to recognise the state of Palestine and will likely lead to more Western states doing so. Palestinians overwhelmingly support the October 7 attack and will forever associate it with the renewed central importance of their cause globally and the release of countless prisoners, not with the destruction of Gaza and the casualties of that war. Quite reasonably, given that war is not about casualties or damage but accomplishing political objectives, Palestinians view this war as a victory.   

October 7 has accomplished many strategic goals for the Islamic Revolution, including disrupting Saudi-Israel normalisation, and has perhaps irreparably damaged Israel. Regardless of whether the gambit pays off before Hamas is destroyed, which remains a very unlikely and perhaps impossible outcome, its leader views the results positively, even if he and the entire group are wiped out. We have his messages on the matter: “We have to move forward on the same path we started. Or let it be a new Karbala.” 

Is This What Winning Looks Like?

Victory is a notoriously tricky concept to define, but the Israeli Government has done itself no favours with its formulations. No less than Gallant has called Netanyahu’s “absolute victory” slogan “gibberish”, while former IDF Chief of Staff and now-dissolved War Cabinet member Gadi Eisenkot said, “whoever speaks of the absolute defeat [of Hamas in Gaza] and of it no longer having the will or the capability [to harm Israel], is not speaking the truth. That is why we should not tell tall tales.”

Military campaigns must be assessed according to their declared political aims, not tactical metrics such as alleged enemy casualties. According to the Prime Minister’s Office, the stated aims of the campaign “were and remain”:

1. Returning the hostages

2. The destruction of the military and governmental capabilities of Hamas

3. The promise that Gaza will no longer be a threat to Israel

4. The safe return of the residents of the north to their homes

Of course, it is simply not the case that these were always the public aims of the war, which have evolved since October 7. Adding the safe return of displaced residents to the north to the primary objectives of the war, for instance, was only done in the last few weeks.

Of these aims, numbers one and four are not simply unachievable through this war, but are issues actively exacerbated by it; number two is difficult to gauge based on available information; and number three can’t be properly evaluated for at least a decade.  

Hostages

The war has killed far more hostages, both directly and indirectly, than it has saved. Hostages in this kind of situation are not generally rescued but won back with prisoner releases. This is a fairly ironclad rule in hostage crises, and it is incredibly dishonest of the Government to pretend otherwise.

In January, four senior military leaders told the New York Times that rescuing the hostages and destroying Hamas were “mutually incompatible” goals. Eisenkot himself said publicly in January that the idea of getting the hostages back militarily was an “illusion” and “that it is impossible to bring the hostages back alive in the near future without a deal.” He emphasised this in a War Cabinet meeting, as well, saying, “We need to stop lying to ourselves, to show courage and to work towards an extensive deal that will bring the hostages home.” Eisenkot later accused the Government of failing to get elderly male hostages out during the ceasefire in November.

It is unlikely even 50 hostages remain alive, and while the IDF has rescued several and brought back the remains of others, the hostage issue will only end with a prisoner release, whether now or 5-10 years from now. The only question is whether anyone will still be alive. Returning all the hostages should never have been a military objective.

Safe Return of Residents to the North

It is absolutely bonkers odd that the Government has now chosen to add this to what were already dubious objectives. Barring an expansion of the war to encompass Lebanon, this will not happen through operations in Gaza. On the contrary, this, like the return of hostages or their remains, will only be accomplished through a ceasefire deal with Hamas, which will in turn lead to a ceasefire with Hezbollah. In other words, the only way for both of these stated war aims to be achieved is to end the war, something Gallant is reportedly saying explicitly.

The promise that Gaza will no longer be a threat to Israel

This can’t be evaluated anytime soon.

The destruction of the military capabilities of Hamas

There is no doubt Hamas has taken a severe beating in terms of killed, wounded and captured. Its military chief and his deputy, its political chief and other senior leaders as well as dozens of local commanders have been killed or captured. Its rocket, drone and mortar arsenal has been severely depleted, while multiple weapons workshops and large parts of its tunnel system have been destroyed.

Unfortunately, the numbers being used to gauge just how much damage has been inflicted on Hamas have been unreliable and often contradictory. We need useful numerators and denominators: reliable, specific and consistent estimates of Hamas’ pre-war strength and its casualties, the size of its prewar rocket arsenal and its current state, the length of its tunnel network and number of shafts and how many have been destroyed. We have none of these things.  

In late 2009, following Operation Cast Lead, Yoram Cohen and Jeffrey White estimated that:

Hamas had as many as 15,000 to 16,000 combatants potentially available if all the military, paramilitary, and police forces under its control are counted. The Qassam Brigades had some 2,000 real combat forces, organized into six brigades, each of which had several battalion-level organizations with subordinate company/platoon-level elements.

In 2014, during Operation Protective Edge, Hamas said:

The 'Izz Al-Din Al-Qassam Brigades comprises six regiments. A regiment generally numbers 5,000 fighters and includes five battalions. The number of 'Izz Al-Din Al-Qassam fighters is estimated at 30,000, and they are divided into many units and battalions deployed throughout the Gaza Strip.

Yet “a senior Israeli military intelligence official” rejected this estimate, saying Hamas still only had a total of 16,000 fighters to call on during Protective Edge “divided into six regional brigades, according to the intelligence official, each one made up of 2,000 to 3,500 operatives.”

Then, in 2021, “a senior Israeli military commander” said Hamas’ 2014 estimates were actually correct: 30,000 strong. After October 7, US estimates have ranged from 20,000-25,000, Israel’s from 30,000-35,000, and Hamas’ stand at 40,000. One report said the US estimate was “in addition to thousands of police and other forces.” Hamas also established an auxiliary “Popular Army” after 2014. It’s unclear if these forces are being counted as core fighters.

So Hamas might have begun this war with only 20,000 official fighters or twice that number. Additionally, there are no reliable estimates, assuming there are any estimates at all, of the fighting capacity of any of the other groups in Gaza, at least five of which reportedly partook in October 7 and all of which are engaged in combat in Gaza. Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), for instance, claimed in 2011 to have at least 8,000 men under arms.

Are these all being counted as part of Hamas’ military, accounting for the large discrepancies in estimates? If not, and a portion of the claimed killed and wounded fighters are from other groups, this presents an additional complication to evaluating the damage done to Hamas’ fighting capabilities.

The situation is even worse when it comes to Hamas casualties. On November 14, one Israeli estimate was more than 4,100 killed, including nearly 1,100 killed inside Israel. Oddly, Israel claimed a month earlier that it had found the bodies of around 1,500 Hamas fighters. Hamas says only “hundreds” of its own fighters were involved in the operation, and other groups, not to mention many Palestinian civilians partaking of the pogrom, are likely among those dead, as well.²

Somehow, on November 27, another IDF estimate put the number lower, at 1,000-2,000 killed, although it’s unclear whether this includes those killed in Israel. 7 days later, yet another IDF assessment was that more than 5,000 fighters had been killed. By December 13, Israeli officials were estimating the IDF had killed at least 7,000 Hamas members. In early January, that number was assessed to be 8,000-9,000 killed OR captured.

In late January, the US estimated Israel had killed 20-30% of Hamas fighters, while Israel estimated it had killed about 9,000, including more than 1,000 killed inside Israel. The difference in the assessments of wounded was stark:

Israeli officials estimate that as many as 16,000 Hamas fighters have been wounded and that about half of those won’t return to the battlefield, according to a senior Israeli military official. The U.S. estimates between 10,500 and 11,700 militants have been wounded, said a U.S. official familiar with the assessment, and that many of those could eventually return to the battlefield.

Yet only a few days later, Gallant said the IDF had killed 10,000 Hamas fighters and only 10,000 had been wounded. By February 20, Israel was claiming about 12,000 killed, while one Hamas official told Reuters the group had lost 6,000, something subsequently denied. When the BBC asked the IDF about the 12,000 figure on March 1, they responded twice, saying the number was “approximately 10,000” and “more than 10,000”, with the Israeli embassy in the UK saying 10,000-12,000. Yet on March 11, Netanyahu claimed the number was at least 13,000.

Two months later, Netanyahu said the number was 14,000. Several days later, US intelligence still assessed only 30-35% of Hamas fighters had been killed. Somehow, another report shortly thereafter estimated, based on US intelligence, that about 50% of Hamas was wiped out, with the group down to 9,000-12,000 fighters, although this probably includes wounded and captured.

But in mid-July, two months after Netanyahu claimed 14,000, the IDF was still saying the number was approximately 14,000, but this time killed OR captured. The Jerusalem Post noted the discrepancies:

Already in early May, some Israeli officials had said the IDF had killed 16,000 Hamas fighters. Others at the time said the number was closer to 14,000. On Tuesday, IDF sources said that the number remained at 14,000, but what was strange about the number was that the IDF said around 1,000 Hamas fighters had been killed in the last two weeks of fighting. If true, that would mean that less than 13,000 Hamas fighters had been killed as of early July and possibly another 1,000 or so less back in early May.

A month later, the IDF officially claimed it had killed more than 17,000 Hamas fighters, with one Israeli journalist claiming about 15,000 bodies had been counted and thousands more were estimated to be under the rubble. The most recent statement from Netanyahu’s office to CNN claimed “between 15,000 and 17,000 terrorists have been killed, thousands have been incapacitated and about 4,500 have been captured.”

The IDF seems to be pulling numbers out of a hat, not doing reliable Battle Damage Assessments. It’s also not clear whether Israel is including anyone affiliated with the Hamas regime in Gaza in these figures or just fighters.

These numbers don’t really make sense for anyone paying attention to how this war is being fought. It has been a guerrilla war from the very start, with very small Hamas cells or individual fighters attacking the IDF, not pitched battles with dozens of fighters at a time.

One soldier told me that his hardest fighting only involved a cell of 8-9 fighters, with other soldiers telling him their battles rarely involved more than that. According to others, it’s usually quite a bit less, with one reserve officer describing battles as “usually there is a terrorist, maybe two or three, hiding inside a building.”

Another soldier wrote to Major General (res.) Yitzchak Brik:

You have spoken about the bluff over the number of Hamas dead. How could it be that 300 terrorists were killed in a maneuver, as the IDF reported, if we never saw any enemy with our own eyes, and neither did a paratrooper battalion who fought next to us? I asked a guard in the armored battalion, 'Could it be that the reported numbers of dead are from tank fire?' He said absolutely not. In short, I wonder if the IDF is lying here as well.

One “senior officer in Southern Command” told Haaretz, “It's astonishing to hear the reports after every operation, regarding how many terrorists were killed. You don't need to be a genius to realize that you don't have hundreds or dozens of armed men running through the streets of Khan Yunis or Jabaliya, fighting the IDF.”

So who are these approximately 15,000 bodies the IDF has allegedly counted and can confirm are Hamas? Some may be fighters, but many seem to be unarmed males, who may or may not be working with Hamas in some capacity, entering Israel’s combat/kill zones. It appears that any male killed where the IDF is operating is being counted as a Hamas fighter.

One reserve officer said, “In practice, a terrorist is anyone the IDF has killed in the areas in which its forces operate,” something backed up by several other accounts. Another added, “It's not that we invent bodies, but no one can determine with certainty who is a terrorist and who was hit after entering the combat zone of an IDF force.”

A lieutenant colonel, asked how the IDF identifies Hamas fighters, told Ynet, “Whoever didn't run away, even if he wasn't armed - as far as we were concerned, was a terrorist.” The anecdotal evidence I have from the soldier I spoke with also suggests that this is how the IDF is counting Hamas casualties.

Many or most of these unarmed men may even be Hamas members, but the simple fact is the IDF has no idea how many Hamas fighters it has killed; it’s just counting male bodies.

There is also the question of force regeneration. Politico reported in late May that Hamas had recruited thousands of fighters in 2024. A “retired high-ranking Israeli officer” told CNN in early August, “Recruitment started three or four months ago, and they got a few thousand. I don’t know exactly how many.” A more recent report claims Hamas is operational again in northern Gaza after recruiting about 3,000 new fighters.

The CNN investigation, alongside analysis by the American Enterprise Institute’s Critical Threats Project and the Institute for the Study of War, found that, as of July 1, only three of Hamas’ alleged 24 battalions were “combat ineffective”, a further 13 were “degraded”, and eight were fully “combat effective”, conclusions disputed by the IDF.

A June 30 article in Ynet reported:

The IDF found Hamas has managed to rehabilitate itself not only militarily in [Shejaiya], but also financially. The terrorist organization has managed to resume paying salaries to its operatives and recruited hundreds of new terrorists, some of whom are now confronting IDF forces during their current operation in the neighborhood.

This area had been taken by the IDF a mere six months earlier. Jabaliya, where the IDF claimed to have defeated Hamas by early 2024, allegedly saw some of the most “intense” and the “most violent” fighting to date in May, a mere four months later, when the IDF was forced to re-enter the area.

In mid-July, Ynet reported that Hamas was reconstituting in Gaza City six months after IDF withdrawal, with soldiers discovering:

Large UAVs that Hamas had constructed over recent months. The area showed clear signs of military recovery. Hamas had placed military-grade explosive devices, built observation posts and a forward command post.

Rockets

In late January, security officials estimated Hamas had only a few hundred rockets remaining out of a pre-war total of “about 20,000 rockets and mortar shells at varying ranges, most of them short range.” Unfortunately, in mid-July, the IDF said Hamas still had 1,000-1,500 rockets. It’s unclear how they are coming up with these numbers, particularly given the wide ranges of the pre-war arsenal.

During Operation Pillar of Defense in 2012, some estimates put Hamas’ pre-war arsenal at 10,000 rockets. In mid-2019, Ian Williams estimated the total number of rockets in Gaza could be as low as 5,000 total; retired brigadier general Michael Herzog claimed that Hamas and PIJ had about 6,000 rockets each; and Boaz Ganor said the total arsenal could be as high as 15,000-20,000. A report by the Wall Street Journal in June 2019 said the arsenal of Hamas and PIJ had only been 10,000 rockets during Operation Protective Edge and it had been rebuilt up to that, though it’s unclear if it means each or altogether.

In early 2021, “a senior Israeli military commander” said Hamas had about 7,000 rockets and PIJ had about 6,000, but an estimate after the 2021 war by the Jewish Institute for National Security of America said the pre-war arsenal had been 23,000 and the groups still had around 11,750 rockets.

As of May 26, the Government claimed about 12,500 rockets, presumably also including mortars and other projectiles, had been fired at Israel from Gaza, including those that landed in Gaza or fell into the sea, of which 3,000-5,000 were fired on October 7.

Nobody knows what the pre-war arsenal was before October 7 or how many rockets remain. Most of the rockets are extremely easy to produce, and it’s likely new rockets are already being built, in part thanks to the large amount of munitions fired by Israel, which reportedly could have a 10-15% dud rate depending on the munition. This, alongside smuggling, is how Hamas and PIJ rebuilt their arsenals so quickly after every round of fighting between 2008 and 2021.  

It’s possible the IDF has found and destroyed all the larger underground missile production facilities, which, coupled with a crackdown on cross-border underground smuggling via Rafah, could make it far more difficult or even impossible for Hamas and PIJ to rearm quickly. Arguably, the rocket metric is irrelevant either way since these projectiles have long since ceased to present a threat thanks to Iron Dome and passive defence measures, but this would at least be a concrete achievement of the operation.

What we do know is that as many as 100 rockets, if not more, were fired from Gaza between late July-August, including some with longer ranges.  

Tunnels

Nobody knows the extent of Hamas’ tunnel network under Gaza³ or how much of it has been destroyed or disabled by the IDF. A New York Times report in January said that “senior Israeli defense officials”:

Are currently estimating the network is between 350 and 450 miles…Two of the officials also assessed there are close to 5,700 separate shafts leading down to the tunnels. The numbers could not be independently verified, and there are varying estimates by Israeli officials for the increased scope of the tunnel network, based on different intelligence.

The same report cited a “senior Israeli official” saying that it could take years to disable the tunnel system and that “attempts to demolish the tunnels by flooding them with seawater have failed.” The New York Times separately reported:

Destroying a tunnel section can take dozens of soldiers about 10 hours, according to a senior Israeli officer who is an expert on tunnel warfare. Last year, the Israeli Army discovered a tunnel that had a depth of 250 feet — about the height of a 25-story building. The army said it took months to destroy it.

In late May, US intelligence reportedly indicated that about 65% of the tunnel network was still intact, while the IDF estimates it has destroyed almost 50% or just over 50% of the tunnel network in northern Gaza.

 In mid-July, the IDF said it would take several months to discover all the cross-border smuggling tunnels in Rafah, having found about 25 to that point. On June 30, the Jerusalem Post reported it would take six months at minimum to find all the tunnels and that “the IDF still is far from certain that it has or will find all of the cross-border tunnels between Gaza and Egypt.” It concluded pessimistically:

Absent: several months, if not years, to continue to destroy the tunnels, a jump in cooperation from Egypt, and some way to permanently prevent Hamas from re-digging everything that is destroyed, there should be no expectation that Hamas’s rearmament oxygen will be cut off – it will not. Rather, the question will be how long will it take Hamas to reconstitute the tunnels sufficiently to start smuggling significant amounts of weapons.

Yet a month later, IDF sources claimed to have destroyed 80% of the tunnels in the Rafah area, with Gallant saying more than 150 tunnels had been destroyed along the Philadelphi Corridor alone. Another report said more than 70 cross-border tunnels had been discovered, although it’s unclear if these are newly discovered or part of the more than 150 destroyed. These claims can’t be verified, but one hopes they are correct.

Small, cross-border smuggling tunnels for weapons and other materials are extremely simple to dig. In August 2014, an Egyptian Bedouin guide told Reuters that there were nearly 500 functional cross-border tunnels into Gaza, with 200 new ones dug within 2 years and new ones being dug weekly, although this number was reportedly reduced thanks to Egyptian efforts in 2015.

Nobody knows how many tunnels currently remain or how many there were in the first place, on the Rafah border or anywhere else, but the ultimate success or failure of this operation, at least in Rafah, will depend on indefinite Israeli control of the Philadelphi Corridor, the establishment and maintenance of a large buffer zone, and the construction of a massive underground barrier. Otherwise, a backlog of weapons is waiting in Sinai to enter, courtesy of the Islamic Revolution.

The destruction of the governmental capabilities of Hamas

11 months into the war, the Hamas regime remains intact and retains at least partial civilian control of most of Gaza. It reportedly controls aid distribution throughout much of the strip and allegedly steals some of it systematically, according to both Israelis and Palestinians.  The regime has also resumed paying salaries to its employees,⁴ and its SMERSH unit, Al-Majd, continues to operate.

Hamas chief Yahya Sinwar continues “to dictate the group’s broad strategy”, according to US officials, including indirect negotiations with the Israelis, although he is reportedly unable to contact military commanders consistently or micromanage fighting as of late August, as he was reportedly doing previously, and many of his closest advisers have been killed. A June article in the Wall Street Journal said, “Sinwar has survived and micromanaged Hamas’s war effort, drafting letters, sending messages to cease-fire negotiators and deciding when the U.S.-designated terrorist group ramps up or dials back its attacks.” 

The current state of Hamas’ finances is unclear. There were reports of a “sprawling financial empire” potentially worth $500 million to $1 billion per year at the start of the war, and claims in late January that Hamas was bringing in $8-12 million per month through charity fronts. Israel also reported in late May that Hamas had stolen more than $100 million from Gaza’s banks in April. Control and potential taxation of aid would also help fund the group.

Hamas’ overall leadership has been almost entirely eliminated. This includes multiple politburo members and officials, overall leader Ismail Haniyeh, and the entirety of Hamas’ senior military leadership, including Mohammed Deif, Marwan Issa, and Saleh al-Arouri. Only Yahya Sinwar, first elected to the position of Shura council president in mid-2009 before becoming the group’s official Gaza overseer in 2017 and overall leader following Haniyeh’s assassination, remains.

But even if, or rather when, Sinwar is killed, this would be unlikely to destroy the group, judging from previous leadership decapitations of Hamas, Hezbollah, Al-Qaeda, Islamic State, the Taliban, or any other jihadist organisation. As long as Hamas’ currently existing shadow government remains intact and no alternative regime exists to replace it, the nucleus will be able to regenerate if, and once again, more likely when, military pressure is reduced, despite the body blows.

Operation Gaza Good Enough?

I don’t think there’s any realistic alternative to the IDF’s “Sisyphean” hamster-wheel of constant tactical raids. Despite assertions by Israeli and American officials and analysts, there was never any possible replacement for the Hamas regime aside from an indefinite Israeli occupation. Should this occur, whatever form it takes, it is unlikely to replace Hamas’ shadow government in all municipal areas and will probably be concerned primarily or even solely with aid distribution. The footprint, if one remains, will be too light to be effective in the long run.

Major General (res.) and former National Security Advisor Yaakov Amidror asserted recently:

At the end of the process, the Gaza Strip should become a large Area A, meaning there will be no Israeli military presence in the Strip, but the IDF will enter and operate there whenever there is intelligence on any terrorist organization. The decision to deploy forces will be at the discretion of commanders in the field without the need for political approval, just like in the West Bank. This will mark the end of the war in Gaza.

This is a somewhat worrying scenario in the long term given what has happened in the West Bank in the last three years despite escalating Israeli counterterrorism raids and a massive IDF presence, currently said to be double the number of battalions as stationed in Gaza. The Islamic Revolution has succeeded in smuggling in money, weapons, and explosives, including claymores. The IDF says what it manages to prevent is just a “drop in the ocean”.

The situation has deteriorated rapidly since mid-2023, in terms of number and quality of attacks and the flowering of militant groups and cells, necessitating regular airstrikes, at least 57 as of late July, and recently the largest operation, “Summer Camps”, since the Second Intifada. Israeli security officials have stressed that this is only the start after officially classifying the West Bank as a combat zone.

More than 4,000 have been arrested and hundreds of leaders and rank-and-file fighters have been killed, yet the negative trajectory does not appear to have changed. IDF Central Command is calling for an additional unit to join the effort, amidst a significant manpower shortage. The Israeli military is simply too small and overstretched to sustain tactical victories and occupations.

Gaza, of course, is a smaller and more isolated territory. But one can imagine a scenario where roadside bombs and ambushes target the few isolated soldiers permanently stationed along the Philadelphi and Netzarim corridors every week, especially if the IDF takes on an aid distribution role. This is assuming the IDF is able to retain any presence at all in Gaza, even along those corridors.

Additionally, progressively worse manpower strains due to the Lebanese and West Bank fronts; internal political vicissitudes; and domestic and international pressure will probably lead to a further reduction of military pressure on the remnants of Hamas. If this happens before Hamas is sufficiently degraded, then all Swords of Iron will have done is buy Israelis about 10-15 years of relative quiet from Gaza. I’d consider that a victory of sorts, or at least the only possible outcome, but I don’t know if many Israelis will accept it. The southern Lebanon precedent does not inspire confidence.

Given Gaza’s very high birth and fertility rate and totalitarian indoctrination system, including through UNRWA, within 15 years, Hamas will be back to its pre-war strength, at least numerically.

First Intifada, Second Intifada, Summer Rains, Cast Lead, Pillar of Defense, Protective Edge, Guardian of the Walls, Swords of Iron. One can only wonder what the next one will be called or when it will happen, but it will happen. The status remains quo.

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1. There are superficial parallels between October 7 and its aftermath and the infamous 1978 Coastal Road Massacre, which was meant to be a mass hostage-taking at a Tel Aviv hotel by the PLO to free prisoners. The attack was timed in part to undermine Israeli-Egyptian peace talks. To ensure it couldn’t happen again, Israel invaded Lebanon for the first and last time and solved all security issues and everyone lived happily ever after and there was no more terrorism ever again.

2. Estimates of how many Hamas operatives in total crossed into Israel on October 7 range from 1,500-3,000. A more recent estimate put it at approximately 6,000 Palestinians, of whom about 3,800 were Hamas operatives. Hamas claims its contribution was in the hundreds, not the thousands.

3. A recent estimate in the New York Times said it could be up to 500 miles in length.

4. If one believes any element of this story by Mondoweiss, which nobody really should, but at least this claim rings true to me, the reason so many Hamas and PIJ members were in Al-Shifa Hospital during the large March raid by the IDF was to receive government salaries.