Roadmaps To Nowhere
This 15-point roadmap has been around since May. Trump just wanted to announce something, while Hamas saw a no-cost means to try and pressure Bibi before elections and enlarge the US-Israel split.

The job of [Trump’s] officials is to extract scraps of paper or announcements for him from various parties, regardless of content or contradiction, to placate his senile mantrums and desperate desire for attention and spectacle. Don’t waste your time reading any of the agreements; Trump certainly hasn’t.
– Me, June 30.
What if I offered you a phased deal that, if you accepted it, would result in everything you were desperately trying to avoid? What if I then told you that the only penalty for noncompliance was that the deal would be frozen and the very favourable status quo would be maintained?
Welcome to another episode of Art of the Deal, baby!
On July 31, Trump posted on Truth Social:
Today, the Board of Peace reached a HISTORIC agreement for the COMPLETE DISARMAMENT of Hamas and all other armed groups in Gaza. This is a monumental step toward lasting PEACE and SECURITY.
…
CONGRATULATIONS TO ALL ON THIS AMAZING DEVELOPMENT, THAT EVERYBODY SAID COULD NEVER BE ACHIEVED!1
You might notice that Trump didn’t specify with whom this agreement was reached. The answer was later provided by the Board of Peace (BOP), scrambling to catch up with Trump’s post:
The 15-point roadmap to which Hamas agreed is virtually identical to the one they helped devise with the Board of Peace in May. As the BOP’s High Representative for Gaza Nickolay Mladenov told the UN Security Council that month:
In December the principles of the civilian and security transition framework were agreed among the guarantors. From those principles we built a detailed proposal for implementation. It has been put to the Palestinian factions in session after session. After rounds of consultations and based on feedback from the factions to the proposal, a 15-point Roadmap, accompanied by a proposed implementation annex, was written in response to the questions and the concerns the factions themselves raised (emphasis added).
Keep in mind that the BOP is in practice a mere extension of the Trump Administration, chaired by Trump himself and run by ex-DOGE staffers alongside senior White House officials and Trump surrogates. And Jared Kushner. So don’t take anything attributed to Board of Peace officials seriously. This includes anything Nickolay Mladenov says.
I could and should really just end this post here, because what more need be said? Ugh.
Anyway, the purpose of this roadmap was to implement the 20-point piss-take imposed on both Israel and Hamas by Trump in October 2025, which was only ever meant to be a hostages-for-prisoners deal.
Because all Trump cares about are announcements, not content, all provisions can be safely ignored by both parties, and have been. Trump’s monkeymen have artistic license to insert whatever they want into these agreements and announce whatever they want after meetings, however contradictory or outright false, knowing none of it will or even can be implemented and nothing matters. It’s all just a nihilistic, cynical circus performance for a single clownchild. Just kill me.
There are so many layers of farce involved here that it’s hard to know where to begin, and also completely pointless to begin at all, particularly since Israel has never accepted and will never accept the contents of the 20-point plan or the 15-point roadmap to implement it. The stakes are incredibly low and I am annoyed to be writing about this at all.
While Bibi initially refused to officially comment on the record, he released at least two statements as a “senior Israeli official” rejecting the roadmap. One of his rabid pitbulls, Itamar Ben-Gvir, upon whose consent Bibi’s survival rests, also explicitly rejected the roadmap, saying the policy of “voluntary” ethnic cleansing must remain the approach.
Energy Minister Eli Cohen implicitly rejected the deal and said it hasn’t even been discussed by the Cabinet since announced. Israeli Ambassador to the UN Danny Danon also rejected the roadmap. The Prime Minister’s spokesman Doron Spielman relayed Israel’s rejection of the plan to the Associated Press and other outlets. Israel’s red line has always been that Gaza must be fully demilitarised before any withdrawal.
Sources told Haaretz that Israel is demanding that Turkey and Qatar, two of the parties comprising the International Verification Committee (IVC) alongside Egypt, the US, and the BOP, be excluded. It also demands the freedom to strike areas from which it has withdrawn and the International Stabilisation Force (ISF) has deployed, and that all weapons taken from Hamas must be destroyed. In other words, Israel rejects the roadmap.
Netanyahu has more recently publicly rejected the roadmap himself: “[The Trump Administration] sent us a draft. We did not agree. It is not our draft. We sent our comments. … This is our position,” he announced.
Hamas therefore had nothing to lose in accepting the roadmap, despite joint statements by Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) and initial statements by Ghazi Hamad suggesting otherwise.2 Basem Naim said Hamas had agreed to the latest version, and Hamad clarified Hamas’ demands, which are in line with the roadmap as published.3
By putting the ball in Bibi’s court, knowing he can’t possibly accept this, Hamas intends to drive a further wedge between Bibi and Trump4 and impose domestic pressure on him prior to the election.
Israel has until now demanded that Hamas must disarm before the non-existent ISF could enter Gaza. According to Channel 12, in order to secure a meeting with Trump, Bibi pulled a meaningless stunt by telling the Cabinet to vote to allow an initial ISF deployment of 200 troops all the same, although only to fully Israeli-controlled areas in Rafah, which has no relation to the roadmap.5 We’ll see which additional hollow sops are required to parry Hamas’ acceptance until Trump gets distracted again.
One such example of an empty concession involves a recent Army Radio report that “targeted elimination” strikes now require the approval of IDF Chief of Staff Eyal Zamir, whereas before they only required the approval of division or brigade commanders or the chief of Southern Command. This is nothing. Ignore it.
BOP Executive Jared Kushner also lied to the UAE’s Palestinian surrogate Mohammad Dahlan, allegedly a key facilitator of the agreement, that Israel would halt strikes on Sunday. Nobody cares about anything. Everyone just says stuff.6
Both Israel and Hamas understand that Trump only cared about making the announcement, doesn’t know or care about the roadmap’s content or follow-through (or reality itself), has no ability or will to pressure either side, and has already forgotten all about it.
The 20-Point Plan
The implicit goal of the 20-point plan is indefinite Israeli occupation of a “security perimeter” inside Gaza, with Gaza itself governed indefinitely by the US via the BOP and its colonial secretary Nickolay Mladenov.
Mladenov oversees the National Committee for the Administration of Gaza (NCAG)7 and ISF, the latter of which will operate “under the unified command of the United States through Major General Jasper Jeffers.”8
Technically, the NCAG, overseen by the BOP, is only meant to run Gaza “until such time as the Palestinian Authority (PA) has completed its reform program…and can securely and effectively take back control of Gaza,” according to clause 9 of the 20-point plan. Since everyone understands that this will never happen, the agreement is for Gaza to remain a US colony in perpetuity.9
Full Israeli withdrawal, even from the security perimeter, will not take place “until Gaza is properly secure from any resurgent terror threat,” a vague phrase in clause 16, apparently subject to Israel’s interpretation, that in practice legitimises permanent occupation.
My favourite part of the 20-point plan is clause 19, which states that if the PA genuinely carries out reforms and the entire plan is implemented, “the conditions may finally be in place for a credible pathway to Palestinian self-determination and statehood.”
The conditions may be in place. For what? Not for Palestinian self-determination, but for a credible pathway thereto. Wow. Possible conditions for a credible pathway. I’m sure Palestinians must be so excited for possibly creating conditions for a credible pathway.
Again, none of this matters. It’s exhausting writing about something that doesn’t matter, but we soldier on.
The 15-Point Roadmap
Who even gives a shit? It’s all so dumb.
The Best Alternative To A Negotiated Agreement (BATNA) for Israel is the status quo. Israel gets to keep destroying buildings, shooting anyone near the ever-moving “Yellow Line”, and generally bombing Gaza and assassinating Hamas leaders and operatives at will while maintaining an indefinite occupation,10 essentially the same arrangement it has elsewhere.
Hamas would prefer this wasn’t happening, of course, but the status quo gives it control of Gaza’s population and humanitarian aid. Accepting the roadmap is actually a win-win for Hamas, because:
The status quo is fine, and;
Even if the roadmap were to be implemented, it would result in the “Hezbollah model”, establishing a civilian veneer and police force that would legitimise larger aid donations and reconstruction that Hamas would control from behind the curtain.11
Despite the wording of the 20-point plan, including its first clause that “Gaza will be a deradicalised terror-free zone that does not pose a threat to its neighbours,” both Hamas and Israel understand that the roadmap implementation would take on a momentum of its own, leading to reconstruction and aid flooding the strip without genuine demilitarisation12 despite the on-paper verification and sequencing gates, and that the ISF would essentially be Gaza’s UNIFIL.13 Pressure on Israel for withdrawal and reconstruction would inevitably compound.
Israel also understands that it lost the war and cannot gain through diplomacy what it failed to achieve militarily. It still absurdly continues to demand Hamas unconditionally disarm before it makes any moves, and to bomb Gaza and assassinate Hamas operatives, precisely to ensure the status remains quo and the roadmap is indefinitely stalled, waiting until it can fully reignite the war.14
Israel, rather than Mladenov’s constant lies about Hamas refusing the roadmap, is the primary obstacle to implementation, and for good reason.
The 15-Point Roadmap would force Israel to halt all operations and withdraw sector by sector to an undefined “security perimeter” as the arms decommissioning process unfolds and is verified. It would also potentially create the potential conditions for potential Palestinian statehood, the thing this Government exists to prevent.
So none of this is going to happen and there’s no point writing about this at all. What am I doing.
Okay, so, the BOP’s High Representative Nickolay Mladenov is a liar whose words mean absolutely nothing. This is not necessarily his fault, but by virtue of being a Trump-Bibi surrogate, he can’t be otherwise. The same applies to anything coming out of the BOP, much less Israel or the US. This is important to keep in mind.
For instance, Mladenov lied when presenting the roadmap to the UN Security Council on May 21: “Let me be clear: we had secured guarantees from Israel that, once Hamas commits to this Roadmap, Israel will move promptly to fulfill its remaining commitments under the Sharm el-Sheikh agreement.”
You can literally just say stuff.
Still, we have to use Mladenov’s descriptions of the roadmap, which consists of 15 points divided into four categories:
Principles (1-5),
Security (6-11)
International Stabilization Force (ISF) and Withdrawal of Israeli Forces (12-14)
Reconstruction (15)
Mladenov, May 21:
The architecture of that Roadmap rests on a single principle. The principle is reciprocity. Each step by one side triggers a step by the other… The design introduces a verification mechanism. Each step is confirmed by an independent committee before the next is taken. If a step is missed, the next step is not taken… [the roadmap] commits Israel to a phased withdrawal of its forces to Gaza’s perimeter, on an agreed timetable… as decommissioning is verified, sector by sector, the IDF should withdraw.
Following Hamas’ agreement at the end of July, Mladenov again emphasised that “Withdrawal must move in lockstep with decommissioning.”
After meeting with Bibi, Mladenov seemingly reversed himself entirely, with the BOP putting out a statement adopting Israel’s position:
Contrary to inaccurate reports, we note that the withdrawal of the IDF beyond the Yellow Line will take place only once decommissioning is complete, as Hamas committed to the mediators. This applies to light weapons, heavy weapons, and the tunnels alike.
I must repeatedly emphasise that nothing that is said by anyone means anything.
Principles
Point 1
This requires Israel and Hamas to “reaffirm” commitment to the 20-point plan, the one to which neither side is or ever would be committed, so it’s already dead. No point reading further.
Point 2
This forces Israel to halt all military operations and assassinations and withdraw back to the original yellow line, encompassing just over 50% of Gaza, which Israel has for some reason expanded since the 20-point plan was announced until it now occupies more than 60% of Gaza. Bibi recently declared, “We are now in 60% of the territory of the Gaza Strip. We were at 50%. We moved to 60%. My directive is to move to — take it step by step — first of all 70. Let’s start with that.”
Israel, of course, will not withdraw or halt strikes and assassinations, so why the hell am I still writing.
But the best part of point 2 is, even if it did, and Israel accepts the roadmap, that just kicks off an indefinitely extendable 14-day process to prepare “the timetable and implementation mechanisms” for the roadmap. Yes, those don’t exist yet. And never will! But if in some alternative universe you get that far, then the NCAG enters and begins undertaking its responsibilities.
Hamas has actually been demanding that the NCAG enter Gaza since October 2025; Israel has been blocking their entry. The recent nonsense cabinet vote to allow in the initial tiny ISF deployment reportedly also includes NCAG entry, although Smotrich and Strock are demanding this be reversed and that Bibi “adopt a preventative cabinet decision that will block the implementation of the Roadmap published by the Board of Peace, and to compel the Peace Council to amend the outline so that it aligns with the goals of the war and the commitments made to Israel.”
Thus far, the BOP hasn’t even been able to get a green light from Israel for a “pilot humanitarian zone”,15 which seem to be little more than the Boer-style concentration camps originally envisioned as part of the Gaza Humanitarian Failboat mechanism,16 in the sterile, wholly IDF-controlled area of Tel Sultan near Rafah. So yeah, good luck with doing this in the rest of Gaza.
(You can watch the full January 2026 briefing by Jared Kushner and Steve Witkoff to the World Economic Forum here)17
Point 2 also establishes the International Verification Committee (IVC), comprising representatives of the US, Qatar, Turkey, Egypt, and the US. I mean the BOP.
Let’s assume we are in an alternate universe and have made it up to and even past point 2.
Point 3
“Progression from one phase to the following one shall be contingent on the verified completion of the commitments of the previous phase. This verification shall be done by the IVC, which shall also observe any violations by either party through an enhanced monitoring mechanism.”
But how are violations punished? They aren’t; they are rewarded. The only penalty is freezing the roadmap in place, which is exactly what Israel wants.
Point 4
Hamas and its sister organisations like PIJ pinky-swear “that all civilian governance and security functions in Gaza shall be handed over to NCAG” and that they won’t “interfere in NCAG affairs during the transitional period.” Incredible.
Point 5
Hamas’ “civil servants shall be treated lawfully, fairly and with dignity with respect to their rights. Those whose services are terminated or who are retired during the transitional period shall receive their rights in accordance with the Palestinian law.”
What is “Palestinian law”? Who cares. It’s just words.
Point 5 also deals with irrelevant financial stuff.18
Security
Point 6
“Gaza shall be governed according to the principle of One Authority, One Law, One Weapon. NCAG shall operate in accordance with Palestinian laws, relevant international standards and the principles of good governance.”
Cool story bro.
Point 7
Newly-trained police personnel shall be incorporated into existing police structures. All police personnel shall undergo a comprehensive vetting. Those who do not meet the required standards of vetting shall be offered alternative civilian roles consistent with their earlier experience or retire in accordance with the Palestinian law. None of those shall be deprived of their financial rights, particularly due to political affiliation. All police weapons shall be transferred to the responsibility and authority of NCAG upon its entry into Gaza and the assumption of its missions.
In other words, newly-trained personnel are incorporated into Hamas’ police, but then all are vetted by…someone… while formal authority transfers to NCAG.
Hamas official Husam Badran told Al Jazeera in June:
When [the NCAG] comes to take over the Gaza Strip, there will be no visible weapons in the streets and alleys of Gaza except the official weapons belonging to this committee, which is the official Palestinian police. There will be no armed manifestations like the ones we were accustomed to in the Gaza Strip…We are not talking about handing [weapons] over; we are talking about, at least, weapons not being visible except for the official weapons of the Palestinian police. The details of this matter will be discussed within a national framework.
The NCAG’s registration for new police recruits closed at the end of February. A BOP official claimed to the Times of Israel on July 28 that NCAG had received more than 200,000 applications, and that 5,000 Gazans have been vetted so far by NCAG and the ISF. However, the BOPadoo said these cadets still needed to be trained outside Gaza and then allowed back in, and that he hoped they could begin training “in the next weeks.”19
From the same report:
The official says the vetting was carried out by the NCAG with support from the ISF, which also “took information” from other bodies — indicating that Israeli security forces played a role and likely vetoed any candidates linked to the terror group.
An Arab diplomat told The Times of Israel in March that Palestinians who previously served as Hamas civil servants had been allowed to apply to the new police force, but would have to undergo Shin Bet vetting to be approved.
Another report, citing a US official, blamed Israel for the delay: “The US official says training for the police force has already begun, though the vast majority of the 5,000 vetted recruits have yet to leave Gaza amid Israeli foot-dragging.”
Yet another report also underlined that Israel was the issue:
While tens of thousands of Palestinians applied [to] join the force, and the Board of Peace has made progress vetting candidates, they have yet to depart Egypt for training, in part owing to the lack of assurance from Israel that those who leave Gaza will be allowed to return, two Arab diplomats told The Times of Israel. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s office did not respond to a request for comment on the matter.
Notably, Hamas’ internal security apparatus, the means by which it actually maintains power, goes unaddressed.
But whatever. Who cares. It’s all fantasy.
Point 8
This is the crux of the roadmap, dealing with the “process to decommission and store heavy weapons,20 military production sites, depots of weapons, and tunnels (emphasis added)”, which will begin after Israel ceases attacks, increases aid, withdraws to the original yellow line, and the ISF and NCAG deploy.
Remember that indefinitely extendable 14-day timetable from point 2? The decommissioning and storage process is meant to be “administered and implemented by NCAG in a gradual, sequential and time-bound manner according to” that 14-day timetable, “supported” and “supervised” by the ISF, whatever that means (nothing), with participation by Hamas and PIJ et al.
Here I must stress that this is the only point directly tied to Israeli withdrawal, contrary to the false BOP statement put out after the Bibi meeting. The clause clearly states, “This process shall be linked to an Israeli withdrawal, in phases, from the areas under its control in Gaza and the decommissioning of [Israel’s Gaza proxies] in accordance with article 10 of this Roadmap.”21
“No weapons shall be transferred or handed to Israel or non-Palestinian parties”, point 8 reads, and “only NCAG shall hold, store or control weapons in Gaza” following points 7-10.
At least point 8 substitutes “shall” for “may”. It “shall create appropriate conditions for a credible pathway towards achieving Palestinian self-determination and statehood.”
Again, “appropriate conditions for a credible pathway.” Hilarious.
But gosh, I wonder what Palestinians think of all this?
According to the most recent Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research poll in late October 2025:
When asked whether it supports or opposes the disarmament of Hamas in the Gaza Strip in order to permanently end the war on the Gaza Strip, an overwhelming majority of 69% (87% in the West Bank and 55% in the Gaza Strip) said it is opposed to that; only 29% support it.
Huh.
A BOP official said on July 31, “We would like to complete the disarmament process in Gaza within 200 to 350 days. The demilitarization process will be carried out one area of the Gaza Strip at a time.”
Like I said, ignore anything they say, on or off the record.
Point 9
Personal weapons in Gaza shall be subject to the regulations of relevant Palestinian laws. As the transitional authority in the Strip, NCAG shall be the sole authority to register weapons, issue and revoke licenses and enforce the law, including through reintegration and social support. All factions, clans and components of the Palestinian society in Gaza shall cooperate with NCAG in this process.
This one is among the funniest clauses. In practice, it means everyone gets to keep their personal weapons.22
Reintegration…into what? And again, what the hell are “Palestinian laws”? What “law” is the NCAG meant to enforce?
And given NCAG wouldn’t, by definition, have a monopoly of arms here, this is meant to happen due to yet more pinky promises by not only Hamas, PIJ, and other Palestinian organisations, but all of the tribes, clans, and criminals in Gaza, as well. Has anyone told them?
Point 10
The weapons of Israel’s Gaza gangs “shall be decommissioned and stored under NCAG authority according to an agreed upon timetable. Members of those militias shall not be integrated in the security and police services.”
Unlike Hamas members,23 Israel’s proxies will be barred from any security role.
Point 11
This is definitely the funniest clause:
A Social Peace Agreement shall be signed in accordance with Palestinian norms and laws. It shall include commitments to immediately end internal violence, avoid reprisals, shows of force, military parades and armed demonstrations.
All Palestinians are supposed to agree not to engage in fratricide and not to show off their armed strength. “Palestinian norms and laws”. What?
Even relative to the overall joke that is the roadmap, this is something special. Who is writing this “Social Peace Agreement”? Who enforces this deal? Who is even meant to sign it?
No, it doesn’t matter.
International Stabilization Force (ISF) and Withdrawal of Israeli Forces
Point 12
The “temporary” ISF deploys solely to separate the IDF from NCAG-controlled areas, and “shall not perform any police mission or missions related to the Palestinian society.”
The ISF’s roles include monitoring ceasefire compliance, training the Palestinian police, “securing the protection and delivery of humanitarian assistance and essential supplies into Gaza Strip,” and supporting the NCAG, “at its request, in any other non-policing mission.”
The ISF does not exist. It will never exist in any meaningful way. The Wall Street Journal reported on July 9:
The promised International Stabilization Force for Gaza is struggling to deploy even an initial group of about 10 to 20 troops, according to a U.S. military official and other people familiar with the plans.
…
The Moroccan soldiers, who were meant to deploy in June, are now expected within months and won’t go into Gaza right away, instead training near its border in Israel before beginning limited operations in the enclave. More peacekeepers are expected to join them at a later date.
…
A spokeswoman for Indonesia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs confirmed the country’s participation in the ISF is still on pause.
Despite the setbacks, four countries—Albania, Kazakhstan, Kosovo and Morocco—are now on course to sign formal commitments to the ISF, according to the U.S. military official. Albania’s Defense Ministry declined to comment, and the administrations in the three other countries didn’t respond to requests for comment.
The ISF plans to start its phased deployment within months, the official said, with troops eventually based out of two sites: a Logistics Support Area, a newly built logistics hub in Israel near the Kerem Shalom border crossing into Gaza; and a Mission Support Site, inside Gaza. The logistics hub is mostly built, while construction of the mission site hasn’t begun.
The two sites, once built and operational, are meant to accommodate about 5,500 ISF personnel.24
The small Moroccan contingent, a mix of officers and security troops, will be based at the logistics hub near the Gaza border, the U.S. official said. They will initially be tasked with securing the site, which recently received its first delivery of tactical vehicles. Eventually, troops based there will carry out expeditionary-style operations inside Gaza, like route reconnaissance, the official said.
Israel’s cabinet voting to allow in 200 ISF troops, while meaning nothing, means even less, because there aren’t 200 to allow in.
A US official claimed at the end of July that:
The Board of Peace has secured commitments for 5,000 troops from various countries. However, only a handful of representatives from Morocco, Kosovo, Albania, Kazakhstan have actually made it to Israel for eventual deployment. The Board of Peace official says the four contributing countries will also be talking to other nations about joining the ISF.
Point 13
This is the partner point of article 8:
Israeli forces shall complete their phased withdrawal from Gaza Strip according to an agreed upon timetable, consistent with article “8” of the Roadmap and in accordance with President Trump’s Comprehensive Peace Plan, which includes a commitment not to force anyone to leave the Strip.
The US is also reminding Israel that its voluntary ethnic cleansing plan goes against the 20-point plan. Not that Israel has taken any heed.
Point 14
“NCAG shall be responsible for handling internal security incidents.”
Reconstruction
Point 15
“Implementation of the reconstruction of Gaza Strip and the provision of necessary resources and financing shall take place according to a plan and timetable prepared and supervised by BoP and NCAG in accordance with relevant laws and international standards.”
Literally just buzzwords.
Show Me The Money
Mladenov the Mendacious told reporters in May that countries had committed US$17 billion for this entire process. Over TEN YEARS.
Meanwhile, the Gaza Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment (RDNA) by the UN, EU, and World Bank estimated Gaza needed more than US$71 billion over the next decade, including US$26.3 billion “required in the first eighteen months to restore essential services, rebuild critical infrastructure, and support economic recovery.”
I guess that $17 billion over a decade is at least something, though, right?
Nope! Less than 1% of that has actually been transferred.
The Times of Israel reported on May 20:
Over half a dozen countries announced major donations to the Board of Peace during a February fundraising conference in Washington. The United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait each pledged at least $1 billion, with US President Donald Trump announcing Washington would tack on another $10 billion.
But as of this week, just around one percent of the $17 billion that the US said was pledged to the Board of Peace has actually been transferred, according to two officials familiar with the matter.
…
To try and close the fundraising gap, the US asked Israel to allow a portion of the $5 billion in Palestinian tax revenues that Jerusalem is withholding from the Palestinian Authority to be transferred instead to the Board of Peace.
…
A Palestinian official told The Times of Israel that the PA offered to donate to the Board of Peace, but is conditioning its contribution on Israel releasing the clearance revenues, which Jerusalem is supposed to collect on Ramallah’s behalf and transfer to the PA each month.
“No big deal!” lies the BOP. They don’t even want the money! The BOP “is not looking to immediately collect all of the pledges, and instead wants to cash in on an as-needed basis,” one source claimed. Very, extremely, overwhelmingly plausible.
So plausible, in fact, that a month later, the BOP’s report, transferred by US Ambassador to the UN Mike Waltz to the Security Council, stated (paragraph 33, page 8):
During the reporting period, the Board of Peace received USD 17 billion in pledges for reconstruction purposes. The Board of Peace underscores that the gap between commitment and disbursement must be closed with urgency. Funds committed but not yet disbursed represent the difference between a framework that exists on paper and one that delivers on the ground for the people of Gaza.
So yeah, there’s no money for any of this.
But even if there were, there is no “this”. There’s nothing. Well done for wasting your time reading about nothing, and well done me for wasting my time writing about it.
A senior Hamas official had previously insisted in April that “We are waiting for Mladenov to provide a clear timetable for Israel to fulfil the remaining obligations of phase one, along with guarantees to halt Israeli violations, before any discussion of phase two begins.”
But that was before the Trump-Bibi divide became progressively more public over Lebanon and before the official announcement of the Israeli election date.
Ghazi Hamad to Al Jazeera, August 1:
This agreement is undoubtedly painful. No one can claim to outdo us in what we have done. We did everything we could to save the people of the Gaza Strip through various means. It is true that we made concessions on some issues for the sake of saving our Palestinian people, and, thank God, we were able to significantly improve many of the terms until we reached this formula, which we saw as suitable for implementing this agreement.
We genuinely wanted to save our people and our nation from the dangers facing the civilian population. And I say this clearly: if Israel does not implement [the agreement], we will not implement [it]. If Israel does not abide by its commitments, we likewise will not abide by ours.
Under no circumstances can we abandon—or let anyone think that we have abandoned—our vision, our objectives, or our project. Anyone who believes that Hamas, after this agreement, will retreat or will give up a great deal is, I believe, mistaken.
But this won’t work, because Trump is too suggestible, distractible, mercurial, pathetic, and stupid to be used by anyone effectively.
Aside from the fact that the ISF doesn’t really exist yet in any practical sense, another caveat, as reported by the Jerusalem Post, is that “the entry of any ISF forces will require specific approval from the prime minister, the defense minister, and the foreign minister” and “The Cabinet determined that Israel will have the authority to approve which countries may send forces. These will only be countries with which Israel has peace agreements and that are not acting against the State of Israel or its officials in the international arena.”
Finance Minister Betzalel Smotrich and Settlements Minister Orit Strock are now demanding that Bibi reverse the vote.
Dahlan has since released this statement:
We had known since yesterday that Netanyahu would do everything in his power to kill the opportunity that President Donald Trump had worked on in cooperation with Egypt, Qatar, and Turkey. For weeks, we worked and warned about the criminal conduct of the occupation and what Netanyahu might resort to. Today, the entire world sees the enormity of the massacre he committed in order to block the greatest opportunity yet to begin ending the war and bringing security to our people in Gaza and to all parties.
We pledge to our people that we will work tirelessly, day and night, to stop the aggression and save our people from the crimes of Netanyahu and his government.
NCAG members, not that it matters:
Dr. Ali Shaath – Chief Commissioner; Acting Commissioner for Energy & Transport, for Awqaf & Religious Services (Nabil Shaath’s nephew)
Abdel Karim Ahmed Ashour – Commissioner for Agriculture
Omar Shamali – Commissioner for Communication and Digital
Mrs. Hanaa Hanna Nicola Tarazi – Commissioner for Social Security
Ayed Awni Abu-Ramadan – Commissioner for Economy, Industry, and Trade
Dr. Jabr Ibrahim El-Daour – Commissioner for Education
Dr. Bashir Rayyes – Commissioner for Finance/Treasury
Dr. Aed Mahmoud Yaghi – Commissioner for Health
Sami Nassman – Commissioner for Interior
Adnan Salem Abu Warda – Commissioner for Justice
Osama Al-Saadawi – Commissioner for Land and Housing
Dr. Ali Shehda Barhoum – Commissioner for Water, Utilities, and Local Authorities
Hossni Al-Mghani – Commissioner for Civil Peace
More about their affiliations, primarily with Fatah and the Palestinian Authority, can be found here, but why waste any more time on this?
Paragraph 37 of the May 15 BOP report to the UN Security Council. See note 20.
According to the latest poll, “Public opinion reveals continued profound dissatisfaction with President Mahmoud Abbas, with three quarters disapproving of his performance and 80% wanting his resignation.”
Bibi to the IDF in southern Lebanon, June 30:
The main thing we did – and this is what you are doing here – is to create buffer zones, security zones, not on our side of the border, but on their side. So we are doing this in Lebanon. We have done it in Gaza. These security zones are a paradigm shift. The meaning is that we no longer allow an army of terrorists to have a foothold on our border. We push them back – that is what you are doing. And we destroy, above ground and underground, basically anything that served them as a means of attacking us. Infiltration, attack, terror tunnels, terror villages – all of that is eliminated. This is the directive: leave nothing behind, and you are doing that.
The Times of Israel, citing “what are understood to be internal Hamas documents” that it reviewed, reported on February 23:
[Hamas] is preparing a shadow government, and working to insert military commanders into civil roles once the Palestinian Authority-linked technocratic leadership begins its activities in Gaza, documents seen by The Times of Israel indicate.
…
Hamas is indeed preparing to hand over its records and files on its ministries, The Times of Israel has learned.
But according to the documents seen by The Times of Israel, Izz al-Din al-Haddad (himself assassinated in May 2026), who replaced Muhammad Sinwar after he was killed last May in an Israeli strike, has issued orders for Hamas members to make copies of any files handed over to the new government.
This allows the group to maintain a record of government employees who can potentially be threatened or pressured if needed.
…
The documents seen by The Times of Israel indeed show that the group in recent weeks has focused on moving members of its military wing into civilian roles that are set to become part of the NCAG governing apparatus.
Written orders, apparently from Haddad, include specific instructions about moving commanders from Hamas’s armed Al-Qassam Brigades into civilian roles so that they will be ready to work with the new technocratic government.
…
Two Palestinian sources with direct knowledge of Hamas’s operations told Reuters last week that the group had named five district governors, all of them with links to the Al-Qassam Brigades. They also replaced senior officials in Gaza’s economy and interior ministries, which manage taxation and security, the sources said.
A new deputy health minister was shown touring Gaza hospitals in a ministry video released this month.
“Shaath may have the key to the car, and he may even be allowed to drive, but it is a Hamas car,” one of the sources told Reuters.
This is actually built into the 20-point plan. Clause 17 states, “In the event Hamas delays or rejects this proposal, the above, including the scaled-up aid operation, will proceed in the terror-free areas handed over from the IDF to the ISF.”
Me, October 2025:
Even if the ISF is soon established in some form, which is dubious, its primary role will be to make it more difficult for Israel to resume full-scale assaults against Hamas at will, even as the latter rapidly rebuilds.
Though this would accomplish nothing except more Palestinian suffering and death. The fundamental issue, as I wrote in May 2025, is that:
Without a concrete day-after plan to replace Hamas’ regime and reconstruct Gaza, even if there is “success” as long as the operation and occupation lasts, there’s no victory to be had here… As Bibi’s highest strategic priority is remaining in power, followed closely by preventing a genuinely sovereign Palestinian state or any circumstance that has even the slightest chance of leading to one, Israel has no options to replace Hamas with a legitimate Palestinian alternative. No amount of buildings destroyed, Palestinians displaced, territory controlled or converted into “buffer zones”, or control of aid distribution will change that basic reality.
Israel and Mladenov (a redundant addition by me) also alleged that Hamas had blocked BOP’s Palestinian contractors from entering the Rafah zone to begin construction on the “Emirates City” (because it’s bankrolled by the UAE).
In fact, the main obstruction is Israel, and no concrete timeline for the Rafah pilot zone, which was meant to be begin nearly a year ago, has ever been put forward. The Wall Street Journal reported on July 9:
Abu Dhabi is also behind a planned development in Rafah, Gaza’s southernmost province. The “Emirates Temporary Planned Communities” is a pilot project designed to house about 25,000 Gazans who were displaced from Rafah and meant to serve as a template for other parts of the enclave. The ISF will have a role in securing that site, and the mission support facility will be built adjacent to it, according to the U.S. military official.
Construction on that project hasn’t begun. In May, a crew of Gazan land surveyors were stopped at a Hamas checkpoint and prevented from traveling to the Yellow Line, where they were due to cross into Israeli-controlled territory and assess the site, the official said.
BOP officials (i.e. the White House) have insisted that Palestinians who entered this fantasy zone would be able to exit freely, while others more plausibly assert that they’d be trapped there. BOP and other sources also argue over whether NCAG would even agree to such a scheme, regardless of its reality.
According to the report cited in the next note:
According to an official familiar with the Cyprus talks, the NCAG was split over whether to go along with the Rafah pilot scheme, fearing it would prove divisive within Gaza’s 2.1 million Palestinian population, and put the vast majority on a lower priority second tier in the provision of humanitarian relief.
Shehada said that only selected NCAG members were invited to Cyprus by the BoP after the pilot proposal had been repeatedly rejected by the full committee, on the grounds that the offer of better food and accommodation in the pilot camp could provoke a stampede, leading to a repeat of a series of instances during the war when Israeli forces fired into crowds seeking food from [the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation].
The answer is that none of it matters. Don’t even bother thinking about it.
[Post-publication, because I had missed this report] – The Guardian reported on July 16:
The Gaza recovery plan being pursued by Donald Trump’s Board of Peace (BoP) has shrunk dramatically from an ambitious blueprint for the reconstruction of the whole territory to a small pilot project in the south of the strip.
Even the envisaged pilot scheme – involving a temporary camp for a tiny fraction of Gaza’s 2 million displaced people, with a Palestinian administration, police and a small international security force – is not expected to take shape before the end of the year.
…preparatory work on the pilot camp near the southern Gaza of city of Rafah has not begun, nor has construction of the camp’s ISF support base. Satellite images of the area show disturbed earth but no new structures…
…
The pilot camp envisaged in the current blueprint would consist of portable cabins for tens of thousands of displaced people in Gaza and would be set up in the buffer zone along the ceasefire line near Rafah.
…
A wider range of humanitarian relief items would be let into the pilot camp, but even there, the Israeli government has insisted on a distinction between humanitarian aid and reconstruction, with only the former being permitted.
It is unclear where the funds for the pilot would come from…
“With international support, NCAG shall carry out a comprehensive audit of the financial and administrative affairs in Gaza, and protect, recover and administer public assets and resources. NCAG shall seek to assess the legitimate commitments to suppliers, contractors and other parties – up to a total amount of no more than $400M USD - and address them. The implementation of these measures will be undertaken gradually, within three years, in accordance with priorities determined by the NCAG. Any unresolved financial rights, liabilities or claims shall be addressed within the context of a wider national process later, and in accordance with the relevant Palestinian law.”
A May 8 report said the recruits were to be trained in Egypt and Jordan, “with an Emirati security firm tasked with building a force of some 27,000 officers.”
It’s not clear what happened to the hundreds of Palestinians Egypt had reportedly trained a year ago as part of the plan to create a 10,000-strong police force for Gaza. According to the August 2025 Wall Street Journal report, “Most of the Palestinians in the force would come from the Palestinian Authority’s security services in the West Bank” and “Some Palestinians from the authority’s Fatah faction…could come from Gaza too.”
Given the ISF is also meant to train the police force, who the hell knows what’s going on.
Hamas official Moussa Abu Marzook already told Al Jazeera in November 2025, “If you’re referring to weapons with ranges beyond the buffer zone, then yes, that’s reasonable to discuss [regarding disarmament], because they could pose a threat to the other side.”
The May 15 BOP report to the UN Security Council also specified in paragraph 10:
This decommissioning process is sequenced to proceed in phases matched with commensurate implementation steps by Israel…The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) would execute a phased withdrawal to the Gaza perimeter contingent upon verified progress in decommissioning.
Not after decommissioning.
It also stated in paragraph 8:
Following the release of the final hostage in January, consultations on next steps led by the High Representative for Gaza began in early February. These intensified with Hamas and other Palestinian factions in successive rounds of meetings in March and April in Cairo and Istanbul. Intensive consultations on implementation also continued in parallel with officials in Israel (emphasis added).
Good luck with gun buybacks in Gaza!
KAN recently reported:
The Peace Council is formulating a plan under which anyone in Gaza who surrenders their weapon and commits to renouncing terrorism will receive a payment, it was reported Tuesday evening on Kan News.
According to the framework, which is still being developed, a “weapons buyback” policy will be offered to anyone willing to lay down their arms, commit to abandoning violence, and agree to future monitoring. Estimates suggest that those who surrender their weapons will receive thousands of dollars and be enrolled in a rehabilitation program that is also being developed.
President Donald Trump’s 20-point framework, as well as the 15-point document agreed upon with Hamas, addresses the possession of weapons in accordance with Palestinian law. Under that law, all firearms—including handguns—must be held under a license. The program is intended primarily to collect Kalashnikov-type rifles.
The Peace Council expects international financial support—particularly from Gulf states—to finance the weapons collection project.
Times of Israel, July 31: “The Board of Peace official indicates that some current Hamas’s policemen will be able to serve on the new Gaza force, while others will be assigned other jobs that are not related to security.”
In October 2025, Ynet reported that the US was building a roughly US$500 million base for the ISF.
The Guardian reported on February 19:
The Trump administration is planning to build a 5,000-person military base in Gaza, sprawling more than 350 acres, according to Board of Peace contracting records reviewed by the Guardian. The site is envisioned as a military operating base for a future International Stabilization Force (ISF)…
Israel Hayom reported on July 29:
In recent months, another major consumer has been added: the vast base being built near the Re’im IDF camp. The base is intended to house joint command centers that will oversee developments in the Gaza Strip in the post-Hamas era. It is also expected to serve as the headquarters of the International Stabilization Force, which is meant to deploy in the Strip and maintain public order and security.
Israel Hayom has previously reported that the Americans issued tenders for construction of the base, which will require exceptionally large quantities of concrete.
It’s only been nearly a year, and this process is only meant to last a maximum of 350 days. Take your time, guys.






