Finally

Trump was always going to drag Bibi kicking and screaming back into a deal, something to which the latter has been a roadblock for more than a year.

It is unequivocally excellent news that the 20 or so surviving hostages have been released along with the remains of dozens of many others. It is less unequivocally excellent that some version of this deal could have been done more than a year ago. The only reason it didn’t happen was Bibi Netanyahu;¹ Hamas rejectionism was never the primary issue.

As always, there is disingenuous commentary coming from pro-Israel advocates and Bibi surrogates painting this deal as an Israeli victory and even the result of military pressure on Hamas.² Of course, as I wrote on May 13, the precise opposite is true:

Since October 7, there has been a pervasive, poisonous, infuriating myth, still being bandied about, that military pressure on Hamas would or did lead to hostage releases.

The reality is entirely the reverse: the hostages are held only as long as Israel keeps attacking and refuses to negotiate. As soon as it agrees to ceasefires, prisoner releases and other conditions, hostages are released. Deals were and remain the only route to a general hostage release. As with its sieges, Israel is only pressuring itself for no reason through its own military action while prolonging hostage agony. Or killing them. Eisenkot himself said in January 2024, “I think it is necessary to say boldly that it is impossible to bring the hostages back alive in the near future without a deal.”

I wrote 8 months ago how dishonest Israeli officials were being in this regard. Yotam Cohen, the brother of a kidnapped soldier, put it best: “An entire nation has been deceived. They tell us that military pressure will bring the hostages back, when in fact all it does is kill them.”

It would be one thing if Israel had a serious plan to replace Hamas and was sacrificing the hostages in pursuit of a cold but realistic strategy to destroy the organisation. Currently, however, the “plan” will kill the hostages and fail to do any lasting damage to Hamas’ political or military power. More IDF soldiers, not to mention thousands of Palestinian civilians, are going to be killed and wounded for no reason, and all the hostages will still die.

Hamas will remain armed and in control of Gaza in the absence of a complete and indefinite Israeli military reoccupation, and likely even with one, and the sooner Israel accepts its inability to change this under current conditions, the sooner it can make a deal with Hamas for the remaining hostages or their bodies and “permanently” end the war.

The White House itself is quite explicit that this deal is the result of “maximum pressure” on Israel,³ particularly after its abortive strike against Hamas’ negotiating team in Qatar, for which Bibi was forced to apologise.⁴ Again, as I wrote on May 13:

Trump wants a ceasefire, or at least the concept of a ceasefire. He wants made-for-TV/Twitter announcements… He doesn’t care how, and he doesn’t care at all about Hamas remaining armed and in power. And now that he’s seen talking to Hamas, Qatar, and Egypt… can easily get him what he wants, he will pursue that route and eventually force Israel into whatever deal or deals result… Bibi has reportedly already set October 2025 as a “final deadline” for the war, meaning that… Israel will once again enter into a deal with Hamas after months of pointless delay… That deadline seems to be a response to the Trump Administration reportedly setting time limits for the IDF and pressuring them to quickly end the war.

So far, so predictable, and right on schedule.

Hamas’ terms for releasing all the hostages have been very clear and unwavering since 2023: hostages would be released for prisoners and a guaranteed end to the war.⁵ When Israel refused such a deal in January 2024, Hamas said that no new hostages would be released. However, this did not stop internal pressure on Bibi from his war cabinet and security officials. As I wrote in September 2024:

The war has killed far more hostages, both directly and indirectly, than it has saved. Hostages in this kind of situation are not generally rescued but won back with prisoner releases. This is a fairly ironclad rule in hostage crises, and it is incredibly dishonest of the Government to pretend otherwise.

In January, four senior military leaders told the New York Times that rescuing the hostages and destroying Hamas were “mutually incompatible” goals. Eisenkot himself said publicly in January that the idea of getting the hostages back militarily was an “illusion” and “that it is impossible to bring the hostages back alive in the near future without a deal.” He emphasised this in a War Cabinet meeting, as well, saying, “We need to stop lying to ourselves, to show courage and to work towards an extensive deal that will bring the hostages home.” Eisenkot later accused the Government of failing to get elderly male hostages out during the ceasefire in November.

It is unlikely even 50 hostages remain alive, and while the IDF has rescued several and brought back the remains of others, the hostage issue will only end with a prisoner release, whether now or 5-10 years from now. The only question is whether anyone will still be alive. Returning all the hostages should never have been a military objective.⁶

Former Shin Bet Chief Ronen Bar pushed repeatedly for a comprehensive hostage deal until he was forced out in June 2025. Former IDF Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi also reportedly begged Bibi to take a comprehensive hostage deal prior to the Rafah offensive in May 2024, something Bibi firmly rejected.⁷

In August this year, current IDF Chief of Staff Eyal Zamir reportedly told troops that “there is a [hostage] deal on the table, we need to take it,”⁸ and then reportedly yelled at cabinet members a month later that they needed to finalise and take the hostage deal on the table rather than expand military operations to no effect.⁹

That August proposal is more or less the meat of the 20-point framework that was eventually released by the Trump Administration:

First, the leaders and employees of the first and second echelons [of Hamas] — the military, police, heads of agencies and ministries — are ready to retire. In addition, it is proposed to start collecting weapons throughout the Gaza Strip, starting with tribal formations and small gangs, gradually moving to Hamas forces. Thirdly, the movement agrees to the deployment of Arab troops to ensure security, including the deployment of part of the forces in the border strip as a buffer zone. Meanwhile, three years later, Hamas is ready to return to political activity in the format of the Al-Khalas party, which is not formally affiliated with the movement itself.

In turn, the Israeli media, citing government sources, reported on the new initiative of the mediators. According to these sources, the plan provides for the release of all hostages, including the dead, in exchange for amnesty for a number of Palestinian prisoners, the disarmament of Hamas and the withdrawal of Israeli troops from the strip under joint Arab-American control.

The document also includes a commitment by Hamas to freeze the activities of its armed wing, the Izzaddin al-Qassam Brigades, and hand over its arsenal, while negotiations on a permanent cease-fire should proceed in parallel. It is worth noting that Hamas has repeatedly refused to disarm, which was one of the key points of contention between the parties.

— The term “freezing of weapons” is now mentioned in a number of reports. This is part of the proposal by Turkey, Egypt and Qatar, which brought the Hamas delegation to Cairo, led by al-Haya. This is not only about freezing weapons, but also about completely freezing the activities of Hamas — political, managerial and military. Weapons should be stored and stored in specially designated areas, but the wording in the public space will be “collecting weapons in Gaza as a whole,” he explained.

The draft proposal also reportedly called for “the formation of a group of 15 Palestinian technocrats to manage the sector for a six-month transition period under the leadership of the Palestinian National Authority.”

It is vital to understand the logic of Hamas’ mass kidnapping on October 7. Initially, the hostages were meant to serve four primary purposes:

1. Bargaining chips for mass prisoner releases

2. Leverage to force Israel to declare an end to the war

3. Human shields to delay or blunt IDF retaliation

4. Psychological warfare

When Israel quickly demonstrated that its no-holds-barred military campaign would not be stopped by the hostages, and the IDF directly and indirectly killed or nearly killed several hostages,¹⁰ the third purpose became inoperative. The fourth goal, while technically successful, was seen to have no impact on Bibi and his coalition, and therefore also jettisoned.

Only the first two goals remained, and Hamas continuously tried to offload the hostages in exchange for mass prisoner releases and a declared end to the war. It is not true, as the Americans keep claiming, that they convinced Hamas that the hostages were more a liability than a strategic asset. As has been the case since they were kidnapped, the hostages were viewed as bargaining chips to be traded.

By May 2024, Hamas was accepting proposals for such a deal, until something concrete was finally announced later that month by Biden.¹¹ Netanyahu then obstructed that deal until January 2025,¹² when the incoming Trump Administration forced him into a variant of it.

Again, Hamas signed onto this deal, which would’ve seen all the hostages released eventually, but Netanyahu quickly moved to thwart phase II and unilaterally abrogated the deal Hamas had agreed to, restarting the war to keep his coalition intact.¹³

Hamas: Baqiya wa Tatamadad

Almost immediately after the deal was announced, Hamas deployed thousands of operatives to secure the streets in areas vacated by the IDF and hunt down Palestinian collaborators and looters, reportedly seizing the weapons, vehicles and ammunition that Israel had given its proxy militias.¹⁴ It also appointed new governors. Public executions by Hamas have been accompanied by a general amnesty for some gang members. According to Joe Truzman:

The Gaza Ministry of Interior and National Security (Hamas) announced a general amnesty and opportunity for repentance for members of local gangs who were not involved in killings or bloodshed, allowing them to surrender within one week (Oct. 13–19, 2025) to settle their legal and security status.

Hamas is also clearing roads and doing some infrastructure repair and has begun collecting unexploded Israeli bombs and shells to build rockets and IEDs.

When asked about Hamas’ public executions,¹⁵ Trump said, “They did take out a couple of gangs that were very bad gangs, very, very bad. And that didn’t bother me much, to be honest with you.” Trump also said the US had given Hamas approval to reassert violent control “for a period of time”.

Not long thereafter, Trump said, “If Hamas continues to kill people in Gaza, which was not the Deal, we will have no choice but to go in and kill them. Thank you for your attention to this matter!”

So there’s that.

Hamas’ ability to rapidly deploy so many operatives in such an organised fashion, and the fact that it already had officials ready to appoint to run areas from which the IDF withdrew, shows that the war has done no lasting damage to the movement at either the military or political level.

This all looks depressingly familiar. Despite heavy casualties and the assassination of most of its leadership, Hamas can still smoothly and efficiently coordinate and control all political and military moves, and faces no serious internal resistance.

Israel currently assesses Hamas still retains about 20,000 fighters, hundreds of rockets, and more than half of their tunnels.¹⁶

Preliminary Assessment: A Stupid But Necessary Circuit Breaker

There’s no sense wasting time analysing most of the 20-point “peace plan”, though I am going to waste some time, anyway, without comprehensively addressing this fatuous fantasy. The “plan” is in any case better thought of as political cover for Bibi to accept what was merely a deal to release hostages in exchange for ending the war, something he swore he’d never do and could have done long ago.

So, point 12 cancels out Trump’s original goal, which he announced a mere 8 months ago, of depopulating Gaza. This has also been the entire Israeli “strategy” since October 2023.¹⁷

Trump just wanted to release his concept of a plan, and he liked the symbolism of announcing it around the two-year anniversary of October 7. He doesn’t care for details or implementation or anything else aside from public spectacle, praise and prizes. Art of the deal.