Operation Gideon's Chariots: A Poor Messaging Campaign Masquerading as a Poor Plan

Bibi is hoping Hamas or Trump can save Israel from its own rhetoric

Could Israel’s ostensible new gambit in Gaza, dubbed “Operation Gideon’s Chariots”, succeed where Operation Swords of Iron failed?

To quote Mark Brendanawicz, “I would say, is it likely? No, it’s not likely. You know. But, is it possible? No, it’s not possible.”

After a gigantic huff of copium and maybe a traumatic brain injury, I could perhaps understand why some would have hope. For instance, Donald Trump is no Joe Biden, not least because of his fantastically deranged concept of a plan to forcibly evict the entire population of Gaza to turn it into “the Riviera of the Middle East”, the stuff of wet dreams for some on the Israeli right, including cabinet ministers. Nor are there any munitions or systems being withheld or US political pressure restricting IDF conduct.

Secondly, and as a result, Israel has cut off humanitarian aid, electricity and fuel to Gaza since early March, allegedly depriving Hamas of much needed revenue and causing a cash crunch that’s hurting the organisation’s ability to pay salaries. There are now desultory but widespread protests by Gazans against Hamas.

But none of this matters, even without the impact of the above being blown out of proportion, which it has been. If Hamas felt it was under existential pressure, it wouldn’t respond the way it has. Hamas, unfortunately, understands that time works in its favour and that the pressure is on Israel, not Hamas, in large part because Israel continuously chooses to pressure itself, but also because Hamas understands Trump and Israel still somehow does not.

Without a concrete day-after plan to replace Hamas’ regime and reconstruct Gaza, even if there is “success” as long as the operation and occupation lasts, there’s no victory to be had here.

As Bibi’s highest strategic priority is remaining in power, followed closely by preventing a genuinely sovereign Palestinian state or any circumstance that has even the slightest chance of leading to one, Israel has no options to replace Hamas with a legitimate Palestinian alternative. No amount of buildings destroyed, Palestinians displaced, territory controlled or converted into “buffer zones”, or control of aid distribution will change that basic reality.

Now, if Israel can ethnically cleanse Gaza¹ convince a substantial proportion of the Gazan population to “voluntarily” emigrate and convince other countries to resettle them,² and if the report of preliminary discussions about the US heading a temporary post-war administration of Gaza is true and actually leads to anything, that could maybe change the equation, depending on other factors. But none of this will happen.

On the contrary, the Trump Administration is the first to engage directly with Hamas since the 1990s, and it got what it wanted: hostage and dual-citizen Edan Alexander was unconditionally released by Hamas as a result of talks that cut Israel out of the process. This goodwill gesture is already paying dividends, with Trump declaring:

This was a step taken in good faith towards the United States and the efforts of the mediators — Qatar and Egypt — to put an end to this very brutal war and return ALL living hostages and remains to their loved ones. Hopefully this is the first of those final steps necessary to end this brutal conflict. I look very much forward to that day of celebration!

Trump wants a ceasefire, or at least the concept of a ceasefire. He wants made-for-TV/Twitter announcements, like an American hostage being released. He doesn’t care how, and he doesn’t care at all about Hamas remaining armed and in power. And now that he’s seen talking to Hamas, Qatar, and Egypt (and Oman and Iran) can easily get him what he wants, he will pursue that route and eventually force Israel into whatever deal or deals result.³

Gideon’s Chariots

Details of “Gideon’s Chariots” remain vague, though reportedly entail the conquest of parts, or all, of the Gaza Strip, the destruction of all remaining buildings and the displacement of the entire population to the south.⁴ Bibi himself said, “We’ll call up reserves to come, hold territory — we’re not going to enter and then exit the area, only to carry out raids afterward. That’s not the plan. The intention is the opposite.”⁵

It’s more probable there is no such operation in the works and the leaks are merely a laughably poor bluff. If it is simply a bluff, the intended audience is not only Hamas, but the Israeli electorate, as well.

Bibi rightly fears Trump is going to force him back into the ceasefire that he repudiated solely to ensure he maintained power.⁶ This entire farce would send the message that “we were about to do something serious, but the Americans again stopped us. Shoot!” Bibi is so desperate not to follow through that he’s leaking and blustering as a cry for help to the Americans to save him from his coalition partners.

But it is also a cri de cœur directed towards Hamas. What is painted as a deliberate, three-stage effort to pressure Hamas into releasing hostages on Israel’s terms without having to carry out this purported plan is in fact a plaintive cry to Hamas to stop Israel shooting itself in the face. Bibi recognises the rhetoric and leaks, intended solely as an idiotic negotiation tactic, have trapped Israel on a dead-end, inexorable path to actually implementing Gideon’s Chariots, and he’ll need Trump or Hamas to save the country from the course upon which he’s set it. Basically this:

Although Bibi abrogated the ceasefire for his own political reasons rather than any strategic exigency, it was always doomed to fail before Phase II, which he never had any intention of negotiating, regardless of one’s view on whether his position is correct. Prior to scuttling the current agreement, Bibi obstructed a virtually identical deal to Phase I, which could’ve been achieved a year ago, thus leading to the deaths of hostages in the interim that would otherwise have been released. The simple fact is, for better or worse, Bibi does not care about the hostages.

But let’s pretend for a moment that Gideon’s Chariots is an actual plan and that Israel maladroitly pressures itself into carrying it out: it’s not going to achieve either of its stated goals.

According to the IDF, “The supreme mission that the IDF is dealing with is our moral duty to return the hostages. The second mission is defeating Hamas. We are working to advance both goals, with the return of the hostages being at the top [of the list of priorities].” Gaza Division commander Brig. Gen. Barak Hiram had said on April 21 that “The immediate purpose of the mission is to exert more pressure on Hamas to return the hostages.”

According to Israel’s somehow STILL prime minister, on the other hand, the “supreme goal” is “victory”, whatever the hell that means, rather than returning the few remaining living hostages and the remains of the rest.

All of them are wrong. And lying. There is no plan. The full extent of Israeli planning and thinking, or what passes for such, both before and during the war has been:

1. Destroy Gaza’s infrastructure

2. Displace the population

3. ???

4. Absolute victory and all hostages returned

Since at least January 2024, senior Israeli political and security officials have said on and off the record that the only way to get the hostages out was with a comprehensive deal, and that the goals of destroying Hamas’ political and military power and releasing the hostages were “mutually incompatible”. The IDF is already warning the Government that a renewed offensive will endanger the remaining hostages.

Neither goal was ever achievable militarily given Israeli ideological and logistical constraints. Both then Defence Minister Yoav Gallant and former IDF Chief of Staff and then War Cabinet member Gadi Eisenkot derided Bibi’s slogan of “absolute victory” as mendacious nonsense. And so it remains.

Siege: Israel vs Israel

Before Operation Swords of Iron, Israel cut off aid, electricity, fuel and water to Gaza, but was quickly forced to lift its siege, having put pressure on nobody but itself due to the looming humanitarian crisis.

For some reason, it has decided to do the same thing again, and somehow everything has (surprised Pikachu face) ended exactly the same way, with Israel pressuring only itself to try and lift the siege.

Consistent with the ongoing travesty that is everything this Government does, Israel repeatedly asserted that more than enough aid had gone into Gaza in January and February, so the siege wouldn’t impact anyone. Which naturally raises the question: What the hell was the point of any of this?

Allegedly, it’s because “The resale of international aid has become [Hamas’] dominant revenue stream,” allowing it to recruit new operatives and pay regular salaries.⁷ The new aid distribution mechanism under discussion is meant to hamper Hamas’ ability to do this.⁸ It won’t, though, assuming such a plan is implemented at all, which also probably won’t happen.

Already, a May 5 report in Israel Hayom claims that millions of dollars of goods are still going into Gaza:

The exact route by which the goods are reaching Gaza, and whether this occurs with any form of official approval, remains unknown. What is evident, however, is that at least part of the profits generated from these sales ultimately find their way into the hands of Hamas.

This so-called “Gaza Humanitarian Foundation” (GHF) sounds great on paper.⁹ But the GHF’s own memo says its initial four “Secure Distribution Sites” (SDS) could each only provide for about 300,000 Gazans each, and not even that at first. It claims this could eventually be scaled up to meet the needs of the entire population of some 2 million, but gives no timeframe. A recent NPR report, with British understatement, says, “Key details remain unresolved, like who would run it or pay for it.” Recall that this operation could be launched as soon as next week, according to the Israelis.

Israeli officials themselves concede that the IDF knows Gazans are “nearing starvation”, but are hoping to evict enough of the population from the Strip to “minimize the discrepancy between the aid initiative’s initial capacity and Gaza’s total population.”¹⁰