Lebanon: To War or Not to War

The case for and against a war with Hezbollah

Since October 8, 2023, Hezbollah and Israel have been engaged in a low-level conflict that has all the hallmarks of an Israeli shaping operation in anticipation of a major offensive, with several senior commanders and hundreds of rank-and-file fighters killed.

Israel faces a pressing problem: tens of thousands of citizens have been displaced for nearly a year, not only due to incessant Hezbollah bombardment, but also the ever-present fear of a larger-scale repeat of October 7 in the north as long as Hezbollah remains entrenched at the border.

Despite this, based on historical precedent and Israeli political, economic and logistical constraints, I don’t think the cost-benefit analysis currently favours a unilateral escalation in Lebanon, with all the potential risks and dubious prospects of long-term success that would entail.

I also do not assess anything on the scale of October 7 is something that could happen more than once in such a short timeframe, and even that time was a political product of hubris and delusion from which broader threats cannot be extrapolated. Israel’s intelligence penetration of Hezbollah is qualitatively different to its pre-October 7 laissez-faire attitude towards Hamas. This is therefore not an imminent threat in the north requiring an invasion of Lebanon.

Finally, the current situation in the north can be resolved with a ceasefire in Gaza, something which seems inevitable and imminent regardless of one’s position on the issue not only due to US pressure, but also to internal pressure from Israel’s security establishment.¹

I’ll first lay out the case against, including a brief, non-comprehensive overview of Israel’s liabilities, and then the hypothetical case in favour of an operation, illustrated by a pessimistic and optimistic scenario respectively.

Israeli Political and Logistical Constraints

Manpower

As a result of budget cuts as well as puzzling assumptions and myopic strategic decisions over the last two decades, the IDF ground forces, like those of other Western militaries, have been drastically reduced in size.² Just between Gaza and the West Bank, where often more than half of the active-duty army is deployed, the IDF is severely overstretched, with Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi warning of dire troop shortages and recruitment issues. The army allegedly needs approximately 5,000 more troops to complete its tasks just in Gaza.

The situation has rapidly deteriorated in the West Bank not only due to battles with Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad and other insurgent groups, but also because of emboldened Israeli extremists rampaging throughout the area and undermining the IDF, necessitating further deployments.    

In the interim, exhausted reservists are being called back up and their retirement postponed as a stopgap measure. Many reserve units are also alarmingly undermanned. Unless the IDF can successfully draft ultra-orthodox men by the tens of thousands in a very short amount of time, which is highly unlikely, it’s unclear how even the current manpower deficit can be addressed, much less how the IDF would sustain a Lebanon operation while dealing with Gaza and the West Bank.

Munitions and spare parts

Aside from manpower issues, the IDF is also suffering a munitions and spare parts shortage, one that can obviously only get worse as time goes on, particularly as several countries have reportedly stopped selling Israel ammo and raw materials. There is already munition rationing in Gaza, partially due to fears over a Hezbollah war.

While Israel is reportedly endeavouring to shift to more domestic ammo production, this will not be enough even under the most optimistic scenarios, and certainly not within the timeframe under discussion. At the same time, due to global demand and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and the decrepit state of its moribund defence industrial base, the United States is unlikely to be able to deliver emergency munitions in the requisite quantities during a war or backfill them afterwards.

Staying power

IDF reservists are also its civilian workforce, which means paying a substantial and potentially impossible economic penalty for longer wars. The current professional army is too small and not capable of an indefinite reoccupation of southern Lebanon, something that is in any case not envisioned. A theoretically flawless operation against Hezbollah would still see the IDF withdraw with no reliable force to hold that territory, ending in a return to the status quo ante. And even if the IDF could theoretically maintain an indefinite presence, there is no political will, in Israel or anywhere else in the West, for long-term undertakings. The political vicissitudes in democracies inevitably result in squandering military gains, the only question being how quickly.

US Dependence

Israel is entirely dependent on the Americans militarily and in terms of international political cover, and the primary US regional goal is de-escalation and drawdown. The US would significantly constrain any Israeli operation in Lebanon in both time and scope before quickly enforcing a ceasefire.

Pessimistic Scenario

There is little to no evidence, after watching the war in Gaza for nearly a year, that any of the critical operational issues with the IDF or Israeli political and security establishment and decision-making processes identified after the 2006 month-long war with Hezbollah have been rectified. But even if one assumed a far more competent fighting force capable of combined arms warfare, it is unlikely they could achieve the goal of driving Hezbollah north of the Litani River in an enduring fashion.

Unlike Hamas, which mostly employs locally manufactured RPG variants generally ineffective against Israeli armour, Hezbollah has a large ATGM arsenal, vast strategic depth, technically stretching all the way to Iran, and far more favourable topography.

The group also possesses MANPADS and air defence systems capable of at least shooting down Israeli drones and potentially helicopters. Hezbollah has also presumably learned from watching Russia’s invasion of Ukraine that it can use FPV and other COTS drones to great effect and likely has a large store of these in anticipation of an offensive, which can also be used as anti-air assets. In addition, Hezbollah has an arsenal of larger loitering munitions, or “suicide drones”, as well as missiles capable of striking the IDF inside Lebanon as well as its bases and facilities inside Israel.

Hezbollah also already had an extensive tunnel and fortified bunker system by 2006; it now reportedly has a tunnel network riddling Lebanon that is “ten levels above anything we have come across in Gaza,” according to Brigadier General (res.) Ronen Manelis, who said Hezbollah had built an “underground monster”. Tal Beeri, head of the Alma Center Research Department, described it as:

Hundreds of kilometers of underground facilities excavated into the hard rock – much more dangerous, deeper, wider and more difficult to unravel and destroy than anything we have come across in the Gaza Strip in recent months…Hezbollah's strategic tunnels are fitted with underground C2 (command & control) rooms, arms and quartermasters' stores, field clinics and dedicated tunnel shafts intended for firing various types of missiles (rockets, surface-to-surface missiles, anti-tank missiles, anti-aircraft missiles).

Plentiful and sophisticated IEDs and boobytraps, alongside this tunnel and bunker network and well-armed, semi-autonomous cells, would likely mean a grinding fight and relatively heavy IDF casualties, with the additional risk of soldiers or their bodies being captured by Hezbollah.

As small Inghimasi-style teams delayed, ambushed and inflicted casualties on the IDF from several successive lines of tunnels, bunkers and villages, with their locally dispersed arsenals and ammunition throughout civilian structures and homes, the rest of Hezbollah would harass with ATGMs, snipers, IEDs and drone, mortar and missile attacks from across the Litani, forcing the IDF to wade further into the Lebanese quagmire.  

In 2006, Hezbollah only mobilised about 1,000 operatives and fought up to 30,000 soldiers to a stalemate. Imagine what tens of thousands of Hezbollah operatives as well as Hamas, Islamic Jihad, various other Sunni affiliates and other regional components of the IRGC, could do.

Meanwhile, the Israeli home front would likely be hit harder than ever before, and as in 2006 and currently in Gaza, the rocket fire at northern cities and towns, the very places to which displaced Israelis are trying to return, would not stop for months even if the IDF technically controlled an area, as launchers are dispersed and camouflaged, and rockets can be fired remotely or on timers.

Longer-range, precise strikes by ballistic and cruise missiles and loitering munitions against critical infrastructure and military facilities would also be attempted, not only from Lebanon, but from Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Iran and elsewhere, as well.

The Israeli offensive would begin with a massive air and artillery bombardment, which would run through the pre-existing target bank within the opening week. With IDF and Lebanese civilian casualties mounting and the widespread destruction of Lebanese cities and worsening humanitarian situation, the US would enforce a ceasefire after approximately 1-3 months that would necessitate IDF withdrawal from the area. Even if the US allowed Israel the time it needed, it is unlikely the IDF itself has the staying power to remain in Lebanon long enough to accomplish anything that would make it worth the potential costs.

Following the inevitable withdrawal, Hezbollah would rapidly return to the Israeli border and rearm within 3-5 years, while Israel would be left with dangerously depleted air defence, artillery and air-to-ground ammunition stores; an exhausted and overstretched army bogged down on three fronts, with recriminations between the security and political establishment; IDF hostages, or their remains, held by Hezbollah; physical destruction in some cities; an internal displacement crisis; and extensive economic harm.

Optimistic Scenario

For all the tactical and strategic issues relating to the IDF’s failure in 2006, the fundamental cause was a surreal belief that standoff firepower alone could win wars. No genuine ground invasion was ever planned, with troops committed piecemeal and haphazardly. This would not be the case in a renewed Lebanon operation, which would involve a pre-existing combined arms ground offensive with substantially more than the 30,000 troops deployed in the last week of the 2006 war.

Moreover, Israel’s shaping operation has already killed several of Hezbollah’s senior commanders, including its overall military chief, and more than 400 fighters. To capitalise on these successes, the best time to strike would be now. Manpower and munition shortage concerns are legitimate, but there’s no science behind how many men or munitions are needed for a given operation and adaptation to such circumstances is an inherent part of warfare. No army ever thinks it has enough men or enough ammo.

There are no reliable estimates of Hezbollah’s overall arsenal (see this thread), but the vast majority of it is comprised of short-range, unguided rockets that don’t pose a military threat to Israel. In 2006, long before Iron Dome, Hezbollah was able to fire about 4,000 rockets, which led to minimal damage and fewer than 50 civilian casualties. The displacement of much of the population in the north since October 7, coupled with Iron Dome, has drastically reduced the danger and even psychological impact of these rockets, even if fired in far greater quantities.

This doesn’t mean nobody would be killed and nothing would be damaged, but Israeli civilian casualties and damage to civilian infrastructure would still be relatively minimal, especially when considering the potential gains. Israel suffered only around 100 casualties in 2006, approximately the same number as in the first month of its operation against Hamas in Gaza. Despite higher numbers of wounded, these are very acceptable levels and tend to fall over time as militaries adapt to insurgents and degrade their capabilities.³

The greater threat would be loitering munitions and other “suicide” drones, but with the IAF whizzing across Lebanon, many of these would be destroyed on the ground or shot down, and it’s unclear whether Hezbollah even possesses enough of them to do more than wound or kill a few civilians or soldiers and mildly damage some military or civilian installations.

As for the medium-to-long-range and precision-guided rockets and missiles, these are the primary danger and the focus of Israeli intelligence, and the missiles and their launchers would be the first targets hit in the bombing campaign that opened the offensive.

Even in 2006, Israel reportedly destroyed many or most of Hezbollah’s long-range rockets and missiles, along with their launchers, in the first 48 hours of the bombing campaign and destroyed the rest over the following weeks. Hezbollah’s exaggerated arsenal would therefore not pose a dire threat during the conflict, even if several medium and long-range missiles managed to be fired. The launchers that did manage to fire a missile would be quickly destroyed, with no guarantee that the projectile itself would penetrate Israel’s integrated air defence system.

None of the factors enumerated in the pessimistic scenario would unduly hamper the IDF sweeping to the Litani within 1-2 months, after which it could systematically demolish Hezbollah’s tunnels, bunkers and cells in the south, which could take several months but would have an enduring impact even after a withdrawal.

Israel’s operation could even end up resembling Turkey’s Operation Olive Branch, which rapidly conquered the PKK’s heartland of Afrin within three months, with the group, whether by choice or simply due to incapacity, barely putting up a fight despite its on-paper strength.⁴ It’s subsequent low-level but deadly insurgency never rose to the level of a real challenge to Turkey and its Syrian proxies. Knowing that only its presence in the south was threatened, Hezbollah might choose not to put up a serious fight, assuming it’s capable of one, and simply withdraw and preserve itself.

The thousands of Hezbollahi auxiliaries from Syria, Iraq, Iran, Yemen and elsewhere that might in theory reinforce Hezbollah would be picked apart quickly by Israeli airpower. They wouldn’t be a useful force multiplier, having little knowledge of the local terrain, including the complex tunnel network. Israel could also retain the remains of Hezbollah operatives, as well as living detainees, to trade for potential IDF POWs or their remains, somewhat negating the hostage pressure. Missiles and loitering munitions fired from Iraq, Syria, Iran and Yemen would be no more successful during a Lebanon operation than they have been to date in inflicting substantial damage or casualties.

The destruction of Hezbollah’s long-range arsenal and launchers, the progressive depletion of its militarily ineffective short-range arsenal, the mass killing of its fighters and leadership, and the destruction of its military and, unfortunately but necessarily, most civilian infrastructure south of the Litani would neuter the group relatively quickly. While it would survive and continue to mount sporadic attacks and occasionally launch projectiles at troops or civilian areas, as even Hamas continues to do in Gaza, it would no longer represent an immediate threat.

That outcome would be worth the IDF casualties, however heavy, and temporary suffering of the home front, even without a “day after” plan for Lebanon as a whole, which would be worthless in any case. As long as Hezbollah is no longer fully entrenched at the Israeli border and is simultaneously deprived of most of its long-range assets, its existence is strategically irrelevant for Israel. Hezbollah would be unable to rearm and perform its duty as the vanguard and guardian of the Islamic Revolution.

Having neutralised Hezbollah, and with US security guarantees against Iranian missile and drone salvos, Iran itself would be defenceless and unable to respond to Israeli operations to destroy its nuclear facilities.

1. According to the New York Times report, “Underequipped for further fighting after Israel’s longest war in decades, the generals also think their forces need time to recuperate in case a land war breaks out against Hezbollah.”

2. See also this Ha’aretz article on a new book by Brig. Gen. (res.) Guy Hazoot, a former division commander at the Southern Command, entitled "The High-Tech Army and the Cavalry Army: How Israel Forsook the Ground Forces."

3. By December 13, after 47 days of war, the IDF had suffered approximately 115 soldiers killed in action. About 240 days later, the total killed stands at around 330, of which more than 50 are due to friendly fire or accidents as of July 2.

4. After watching the PKK and now Hamas not putting up serious fights in Afrin and Gaza, respectively, it’s reasonable to suspect Hezbollah also wouldn’t destroy itself in a last stand in the south, although it would likely look more like the Islamic State in Mosul, with a small force making the conquest as difficult as possible while preserving core strength.